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Abstract 
We document evidence of corruption in Chinese state asset sales. These sales involved stakes in 
partially privatized firms, providing a benchmark – the price of publicly traded shares – to 
measure under-pricing. We document under-pricing of more than 70 percent, which is correlated 
with deal attributes associated with misgovernance and corruption. Sales by “disguised” owners 
that misrepresenting their state ownership to elude regulatory scrutiny are discounted 5-10 
percentage points more than sales by other owners; related party transactions are similarly 
discounted. Post-transfer profitability is higher, though uncorrelated with under-pricing, 
suggesting that ownership transfer improved efficiency, even when the transfers themselves were 
corrupted.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
Governments around the world have sold state assets over the past few decades with the twin 
rationales of improving efficiency and raising revenues. The broad consensus among economists 
is that the net effect has been positive – post-privatization, companies increase sales, invest more, 
and earn higher profits (see Megginson and Netter, 2001, for the most recent survey).  
Yet privatization’s history is hardly unblemished. Most notably, corruption in Russian 
voucher privatizations led to the theft of state assets on a very large scale (Shleifer and Treisman, 
2005), undermining in large part the revenue generation rationale for shedding state assets and 
resulting in increased ownership concentration. On the one hand, Shleifer and Treisman argue 
that these redistributive consequences of under-priced privatizations were outweighed by the 
gains from getting productive assets into the hands of those who would use them efficiently. Yet 
these efficiency gains are not self-evident. The shift to private ownership trades one set of 
principle-agent and efficiency problems for another – in the Russian context, a partially 
privatized gas and oil company, Gazprom, had a market valuation of $0.05 per barrel of 
hydrocarbon reserves (Exxon Mobile’s value was $13.68 per barrel), implying an astronomical 
rate of inefficiency and/or misgovernance (MacMillan and Twiss, 2002).  
We study these questions of the distributive and efficiency consequences of privatization 
by analyzing state asset sales in China. The ownership structure of publicly traded Chinese 
companies affords us a unique opportunity to measure the extent of under-pricing in the sales of 
government stakes. With this measure in hand, we may then assess whether firms associated with 
markers for corrupt transfers differ in their post-sale performance, allowing us to examine the 
Shleifer and Treisman (2005) hypothesis more directly than the prior literature on the impact of 
state asset sales. 3 
 
Many Chinese companies were partially privatized in the early 1990s through share issue 
privatizations, yet the government maintained very substantial (usually majority) holdings in 
most firms. For the most part, government shares of these publicly listed firms were non-tradable, 
and could only change hands through privately negotiated sales subject to regulatory approval. 
Since shares with the same cash flow rights as these government holdings were freely traded in 
parallel, we have a ready and credible benchmark to assess the extent of under-pricing. We find 
that negotiated transfers of non-traded shares occur at very steep discounts – on average more 
than 70 percent – relative to the benchmark of the publicly traded share price. We argue that 
much of this discount is likely explained by a standard principal-agent problem where insiders at 
the selling firm – often a state company – do not bear the cost of transferring shares at a discount, 
and may potentially do so in exchange for a side payment or benefits to friends and family.  
Of course, discounted transfers may occur for many reasons. Prior research has also 
documented discounted asset transfers by government sellers (though the magnitudes of the 
discounts we observe may argue in and of themselves against alternative explanations as 
dominant factors).
2 For example, governments may choose to sell their holdings quickly and 
cheaply because of immediate revenue needs or to signal commitment to market reforms. In our 
case non-tradable shares may also be discounted as a result of a liquidity discount. 
We therefore provide evidence on the correlates of under-pricing that have no obvious 
connection to either liquidity or government objectives, by distinguishing sellers that we identify 
as likely engaging in under-priced sales as a means of transferring value.  We focus on sellers 
where the underlying owner is a municipal or provincial government but has chosen to identify 
itself as a private company in transfer disclosure documents – referred to hereafter as “disguised” 
transfers. Since sales by government firms face greater regulatory scrutiny, misrepresentation of 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Morgan Stanley (1997), for evidence on underpriced transfers in Europe. 4 
 
ownership is a means of avoiding regulators’ attention.  We thus argue that insiders wishing to 
put through under-priced sales “on the sly” would naturally choose to mis-declare ownership in 
this way. In regressions without year fixed effects, we find that these disguised transfers are 
associated with an incremental 10 percentage point discount relative to the tradable share 
benchmark. This remains true even after controlling for firm fixed-effects, and also time-varying 
measures of liquidity considerations, profitability, and other factors.  
We also find that disguised transfers are concentrated in the early years of our sample, 
before regulatory reforms in 2002 that increased disclosure requirements for transfers. Reflecting 
the fact that disguised sales are concentrated in the pre-2002 period, the inclusion of year fixed 
effects reduces the point estimate of the effect of disguised ownership to 4.5 percentage points, 
since the time effects absorb the differential composition of deal type in different time periods. 
(We find that a full set of quarter-year fixed effects has relatively little impact on the disguised 
coefficient after the inclusion of a few indicator variables to account for the timing of these 
reforms, consistent with the important role of these reforms in the timing of disguised sales.) 
Also consistent with ownership misrepresentation as a means of eluding regulatory 
oversight, disguised transfers are smaller than other government sales – as we explain below, 
larger transfer size triggers greater regulatory scrutiny. We also report a parallel set of results for 
private sellers of non-traded shares
3 where we show that the transfer discount for related party 
transactions – a well-documented source of misgovernance in many developing countries
4 – is 
3.7 percentage points higher without year fixed effects and 1.9 percentage points higher when 
time effects are included (though no longer statistically significant). 
                                                 
3 These private non-tradable shares originate through two channels: (1) in a privately controlled firm, the stake of a 
majority shareholder also cannot trade; (2) some private buyers obtained shares earlier from state sellers through 
private negotiations. 
4 See Jian and Wong (2003) for an example in the Chinese context.  5 
 
We also assess the impact of these negotiated transfers on subsequent firm performance. 
The Shleifer and Treisman view holds that the new (mostly private) owners may have stronger 
profit motives than state sellers, so performance may improve. Yet our opening discussion 
highlights some of the pitfalls of private ownership in the presence of weak private sector 
governance –investors that are willing and able to pay off officials in state-run companies in 
exchange for share price discounts may also have means and inclination to tunnel value out of 
companies. 
Empirically, we find significant profit improvements following negotiated share transfers, 
both as measured by post-transfer return on assets, and also based on transfer announcement 
returns. We observe little difference across deal types in announcement returns, indicating that 
investors welcome these ownership changes even in the face of corrupted transfers.  
We also document significant post-transfer employment reductions, suggesting that profit 
improvements result at least in part from shedding workers. We find no evidence of changes in 
other operational characteristics, including leverage, investment, or firm size.  
We make a number of contributions to the literature on privatization and governance in 
emerging markets. First, we provide relatively clear evidence of value transfer – likely linked to 
side payments – in Chinese asset sales. Further, we present evidence on firms’ post-transfer 
performance, and the source of these improvements. Our results are broadly consistent with the 
Shleifer and Treisman view – on average, profits increase as a result of state asset sales. This is 
true even for asset transfers with markers for self-dealing, namely disguised transfers and related 
party transactions.  
This paper relates most directly to earlier work on state asset sales, which has focused 
primarily on the governance improvements (and accompanying increases in firm value) that have 6 
 
often come with increased private ownership (see, for example, Gupta (2005) and La Porta and 
Lopes-de-Silanes (1999) for prominent examples of such work; for studies focused on China, see 
Allen et al (2005), Cull and Xu (2005), Deng et al (2005), Fan et.al. (2007), Sun et.al. (2002),  
Sun and Tong (2003), and Tian (2000)). In contrast to earlier work, we assess both the 
corruptibility of asset sales and also its relationship to post-sale performance. Our work also 
relates to the ever-expanding literature on measuring corruption and assessing its causes. Our 
work is closest to research that looks at corruption and firm valuation in the context of publicly 
traded companies (e.g., Fisman (2001); Goldman, Rocholl, and So (2009)).  
Our work also contributes to a pair of research streams focused on Chinese capital 
markets. The block transfers we consider in this paper were used by Chen et.al. (2008) and 
Huang and Xu (2009), though for the very different purpose of estimating block control 
premia. . . Our paper also complements the literature that exams financial fraud in Chinese 
capital markets (See Chen at.al (2006), Chen et.al (2010), Cheung at.al. (2006), Fan et.al (2010), 
Jiang et.al. (2010), Liu and Lu (2007) and Qian et.al. (2010) among many others for references), 
though none of this earlier work addresses the presence or effects of corruption in privatization. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we provide background on 
relevant Chinese capital market attributes and institutions; Section 3 provides a description and 
overview of the data; Section 4 presents our results, and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Background  
State asset sales in China began in the early 1990’s, with the partial privatization of some state-
owned enterprises through Share Issue Privatization (henceforth SIP), creating many publicly 
traded firms where governments – both national and provincial –continued to hold substantial 7 
 
stakes.  In addition, millions of former state-owned firms were gradually sold to the private 
sector, again with governments keeping substantial stakes. These sales reached a peak during 
1998-2002 as a result of the central government’s widely noted policy of Guo Tui, Min Jin 
(“state-owned firms out and private-owned firms in”).
5  
The government wished nonetheless to maintain levers of control in the firms privatized 
through SIP. As a result, more than two thirds of outstanding shares were not allowed to trade in 
the stock market; these are referred to as non-tradable shares. Non-tradable shares had three 
types of owners. First, some were held by state-owned firms that were themselves owned by 
provincial or city governments; we refer to their holdings as state owned enterprise shares, or 
SOE shares. Second, non-tradable shares were directly held by the central government through 
its State-owned Asset Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council 
(henceforth SASAC), or directly by local governments; we refer to these holdings as state 
shares.
6 Finally, some non-tradable shares were held by (generally well-connected) private firms; 
their holdings are referred to as private shares.  
While these shares did not trade on an exchange, ownership could be transferred through 
private negotiation. In the case of state and SOE shares, a sale required approval by government 
regulators.
7 Note that when a transfer was made, the shares’ classification changed according to 
the identity of its new owner. For example, if a provincial SOE sold a block of shares to a private 
company, the shares’ classification shifted from SOE to private. 
These “negotiated transfers” created the potential for rent-seeking: The managers of 
state-owned enterprises, which possessed large non-tradable holdings in many publicly traded 
                                                 
5 Data on this latter set of government asset sales is very sparse. In any event, since no tradable shares exist for 
companies without a SIP, we do not have a benchmark value to compare the price set for asset transfers. 
6 Shares held by central government SOEs (Zhongyang Qiye) like SINOPEC are also defined as “state shares”. 
7 See http://preview.fec2.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/laws/200512/20051201243609.html for details on regulatory 
statutes. 8 
 
firms, were responsible for negotiating the prices of share transfers, while the firm (i.e., not the 
manager) suffered the resultant cost of a low price. This created an obvious potential for 
prospective buyers to bribe managers to set low transfer prices in exchange for a private 
payments.  
This principal-agent problem is a function of the extent of monitoring and oversight of 
negotiated transfer deals. As already noted, sales by state and SOE sellers faced greater scrutiny 
than those made by private sellers because of the need for government approval. However, many 
SOE sellers were able to avoid greater oversight by registering their shareholdings in transfer 
deal documents as private shares, thus misrepresenting their true ownership. As a result, the 
seller identity simply showed up as a private entity in the deal documents. We refer to these 
companies – state-owned entities with holdings registered as private shares – as “disguised” 
firms. This misrepresentation of corporate ownership is documented in Shao (2007) and Zuo 
(2006), among others. We contrast these companies with those truthfully revealing their SOE 
status, which we refer to as “face-value SOE” firms.  
While it is possible to disentangle the ultimate ownership of disguised shares (obviously 
we have done so for the purposes of this paper), regulators may choose to avoid delving too 
deeply into such matters – many CEOs of state-owned firms are former local government 
officials, and may have close ties to regulators or their political bosses. (See Fan, Wong and 
Zhang (2007) for one description of the political ties of CEOs in listed firms in China and .) 
They may also receive side payments themselves in exchange for turning a blind eye (see, for 
example, Zuo, 2006).  9 
 
 Disguising government ownership is thus a channel for eluding oversight that provides 
an “ask me no questions and I’ll tell you no lies” absolution to regulators.
8  
 
Rules governing negotiated transfers 
All state and SOE sales had to be reported to government regulators. In addition, deals above 
certain size cutoffs were reported publicly. These public reporting requirements applied equally 
to government and private sellers; our data are derived from these public disclosures.  
According to Rule 47 in the Temporary rules on stock issuance and trading 
administration (henceforth Trading Rules) issued by the State Council of the People’s Republic 
of China in May, 1993, once a non-tradable shareholder directly or indirectly holds 5 percent of 
outstanding shares of a listed firm, it must disclose this holding information publicly within three 
working days. Once this 5 percent threshold has been reached, the owner of the shares must also 
disclose its holdings whenever it directly or indirectly buys or sells 2 percent of shares 
outstanding of the listed firm.
 9  
Thus, some deals by either owners with relatively small stakes or transfers of a relatively 
modest size will not appear in our data. For example, if a firm held 4 percent of outstanding 
shares as non-tradable shares and sold any proportion of its holdings through private negotiation, 
no public disclosure would have been required; instead it needed only to register this deal at the 
appropriate stock exchange. If the owner held more than 5 percent of a listed firm, but sold only 
1.99 percent, again no public disclosure would be necessary.  
                                                 
8 An obvious question that comes up in this regard is why buyers and sellers do not mislead regulators on other 
attributes, most obviously price or quantity of shares. This turns out to be much more difficult, since the transfer 
occurs through the stock exchange itself, which directly observes price and quantity of shares sold. 
9 On December 29, 1998, the 2 percent cutoff was increased to 5 percent. This regulatory change took effect on July 
1
st, 1999.  10 
 
State and SOE sellers faced an additional layer of scrutiny. On May 15, 1996, the 
government issued a “notification on standardizing the administration of state-owned shares in 
limited liability companies.” This put in place a requirement that any transfer of SOE shares 
obtain approval from local government agencies; when the transfer involved state shares, central 
government approval was required in addition to the approval of provincial regulatory agencies. 
In the latter case, stricter oversight and disclosure requirements prevented companies from 
eluding regulation,
10 which may account for the fact that we observe no disguised deals for state 
sellers.  
The extent of oversight increased over the course of our sample period. In particular, on 
December 6, 2001, the CSRC (the Chinese SEC-equivalent) circulated a discussion draft on 
improving the “administrative method on information disclosure of shareholder changes in listed 
firms.”
11 This evolved into a final set of guidelines enacted on Dec 1, 2002. According to the 
new rules, for each negotiated transfer both seller and buyer would be required to disclose the 
ownership chain tracing back to the ultimate owner. While this does not rule out possible 
ownership misrepresentation – again, due to weaker enforcement, political connections and 
widespread corruption mentioned above –it arguably made it riskier for the parties involved (Li, 
2002). 
In an overlapping time period, the potential conversion of non-tradable shares was being 
explored. On June 14, 2001, the Chinese State Council disclosed a temporary act, “Interim 
Measures of the State Council on the Management of Reducing Held State Shares and Raising 
Social Security Funds,” enabling the sale of non-tradable state-owned equities into the stock 
                                                 
10 While China is gradually selling off firms held by local governments, it is simultaneously strengthening its control 
over firms owned by the central government. The latter are generally very large business groups, which may account 
for the very strict oversight. 
11 http://finance.sina.com.cn/y/20011207/152075.html 11 
 
market – a de facto conversion to tradable shares. According to Article 15 of this act, all 
negotiated transfers of state-owned non-tradable shares were required to obtain Ministry of 
Finance approval. In practice, the Ministry of Finance and the CSRC simply forbade all 
negotiated transfers until June 23, 2002 when the government cancelled its plans for the sale of 
government-owned shares (and hence the large-scale conversion to tradable shares).   
For our purposes, there are thus five time periods we wish to control for: the “pre” period 
before any of the announcements described above; expectation of possible non-tradable share 
conversion, but no expected change in oversight (June 14, 2001 – December 5, 2001); 
expectation of share conversion and expectation of strengthened oversight (December 6, 2001 – 
June 22, 2002); no expectation of share conversion but expected strengthened oversight (June 23 
– November 30, 2002); and the “post” period following December 1, 2002 where there was 
greater oversight but no expectation of share conversion.  
 
3. Data sources and summary statistics  
The original deal-level data are from the “Negotiated transfer dataset” obtained through 
CCERDATA, a data provider affiliated with the China Center for Economic Research (CCER) at 
Peking University. This dataset covers all announced negotiated transfer deals from Feb 8, 1995 
to Sep 26, 2007. For each deal, the data include the date when the transaction was first 
announced; the names of the buyer and seller; the stock code and name of the company whose 
shares were to be transferred; the price per share; and the total number of shares transferred.  
Based on the transfer price, we construct our key dependent variable value loss, which is 
defined as 1 minus the ratio of the transfer price to the average price of the corresponding 
tradable shares during the month prior to the announcement date. Intuitively, this reflects the 12 
 
extent of under-pricing relative to the benchmark of the tradable share price. As a measure of 
deal size we define the ratio of transferred shares over total shares (tradable and non-tradable) as 
fraction transferred.  
For each transaction, we obtain annual data on financials such as stock turnover, sales 
revenues, and other balance sheet information, and data on the ownership structure of the listed 
firm from CSMAR, a database on Chinese capital markets. (Much of this database is now also 
available through Wharton Research Data Services.) Where necessary, this is supplemented with 
more detailed data from Resset (www.resset.cn), a widely used database provided and 
maintained by Tsinghua University. These yearly data are then matched up to each deal (where 
there may be multiple deals in a year for a given firm). We also obtain the pre-deal monthly 
stock trading information from CSMAR. These data are used to construct control variables, 
including turnover (the average daily trading volume over total shares in the year preceding a 
deal); log(Sales); ROA (ratio of earnings after interest and taxes to book value of assets), 
log(1+Tobin’s Q) (calculated as the ratio of market value of equity to the book value of assets), 
and dividends (total dividends divided by mean price in the year prior to the deal).   
The CSMAR data are used to calculate abnormal returns for dates around each sale. We 
calculate returns for a range of windows up to one month prior to the transfer announcement to 
allow for the effects of pre-announcement information leakage about impending transfers – since 
the deal is the result of buyer-seller negotiation, at least some leaks are likely to occur. This is 
particularly likely in the case of government sales, since regulators must give approval before the 
transfer is announced. As we will see in the next section, there is clear evidence of pre-event 
information leakage in the data. 13 
 
Finally, these data are also used in our later examination of post-deal operating 
performance. For these analyses, we focus on growth in assets (book value of assets), 
profitability (ROA), investment (ratio of investment to book value of physical assets), leverage 
(total borrowing divided by total assets of the listed firm), wages (total wage bill), and 
employment (total number of employees). 
 We delete all deals that involve the reallocation of state assets within a state enterprise 
(Xingzheng Huabo in Chinese). These are cases where the state simply reshuffles its assets 
within a business group with transfer price equal to zero. We keep transfers between different 
state-owned firms where the transfer price is not equal to zero. We also omit the 17 deals where 
we cannot obtain firm-level financial information.
12 This yields a final sample of 2121 deals 
involving 649 firms. 
A critical covariate for our analysis is disguised, an indicator variable denoting whether 
the negotiated transfer seller is a SOE that has registered its holdings in deal documents as 
private. To construct disguised, we manually recorded the registered identities of sellers’ 
transferred shares using the original deal disclosure documents, which can be found in the China 
Financial Newspapers Database (henceforth CFND), provided by the Shenzhen-based Juling 
Information Company. In each case, the disclosure documents list the company name and also 
whether the shares are declared as SOE-owned, state-owned or privately held. 
For each transfer, to determine whether the seller had identified itself truthfully, we begin 
by looking at the listed company’s IPO documents and annual reports that pre-date the transfer.
13 
                                                 
12 Some newly listed firms may not have traded for an entire year. As a result we cannot calculate turnover or 
Tobin’s Q; also some firms failed to report their total sales – these are likely to be financially stressed firms, which 
are called “ST” (Special Treatment) firms in China. 
13 Another concern is that the originally state-owned firm itself may have been privatized before the negotiated 
transfer date. However, this would itself show up as a change in ownership and reported to the stock exchange, and 
hence observed by us.  14 
 
At these earlier dates, there was no incentive for misrepresentation, so we expect honest 
revelation. In cases where the seller is not listed in IPO reports or earlier annual reports, we 
search the “Business Information System database” (henceforth BISD), which provides a list of 
large Chinese firms by city of incorporation, along with their subsidiary companies’ ownership 
status (private or state). Again, we are able to identify firms where there exists a mismatch in 
state versus private ownership declarations. Finally, for smaller firms not listed in BISD, we 
performed an internet search using the seller’s name and the keywords “Guoyou Qiye” or 
“Guoyou Konggu Qiye” (meaning state-owned or state-controlled).
14  
Based on the registered and “true” identities of sellers, we classify sellers into four 
categories: state sellers that registered their shares as owned by the central government; face-
value SOE sellers that registered their holdings as state legal person shares; private sellers that 
registered their holdings as private, and where true ownership is determined to be private on the 
basis of earlier documents; and disguised sellers, where holdings are registered as private, but we 
determine that the ultimate owner is a state-owned entity. Note that both face-value SOE and 
disguised sellers are owned by SOEs, but in the case of disguised sellers, the firm has chosen to 
list ownership (incorrectly) as private in negotiated transfer deal documents. 
On the buyer side, we do not observe any differences between registered ownership and 
true underlying ownership.
15 We define private buyer to denote buyers with privately registered 
holdings. 
                                                 
14 For example, on some local governments’ homepages, firms controlled by the local government are listed. One 
example of a disguised firm thus uncovered is the China Beijing Corporation For International Economic 
Cooperation (CBCIEC) that registered itself as private when it sold 8,400,000 shares of Zhongyan Fangzhi (stock 
code: 600763) in July 17, 2001 to Xinjiang D-Long Group which is a privately-controlled business group held by 
the Tang Brothers. However, according to the Beijing city website (www.beijing.gov.cn), CBCIEC is a state-owned 
firm. 
15 There is little incentive for such misrepresentation on the buyer side. If a state company has cash available for a 
stock purchase, it is likely easier for company officials to tunnel out the cash rather than converting it into 15 
 
For private sellers, there may also be scope for transferring value through transfer deals. 
In particular, private sellers are for the most part firms that themselves have dispersed ownership. 
Thus, insiders in these selling firms may wish to transfer shares at a discount to other entities 
where they possess greater cash flow rights. Any transaction between related parties must be 
publicly disclosed,
16 and we use this information to define an indicator variable, RPT, that 
denotes related party transactions, where such insider transactions could potentially occur. 
When we examine post-transfer firm attributes, it is important to keep in mind that 
transfers result in a permanent shift in the firm’s ownership composition and as a result, we wish 
to assess performance as a function of the stock of transfers that has occurred up to that point in 
time rather than the flow of yearly transfers. To account for the history of transfers for each firm, 
we calculate Prior transfers up to year y as 
 
     	                       	              
     
 
 
where yfd is the year of transfer d for firm f. We further generate a variable Weighted 
Valueloss up to year y that measures cumulative size-weighted value loss as: 
        	              
        	            ∗      	    
     	                
 
This variable reflects the cumulative extent of corruption in transfers. 
                                                                                                                                                             
overpriced share purchases in exchange for kickbacks or favors. As noted, in practice we found no such transactions 
in our data.  
16 Paralleling our discussion around the disguised classification, there may be concerns that some sellers choose not 
to reveal that the buyer is a related party. If this is the case, we are likely underestimating the discount of related 
party transactions. 16 
 
Finally, to control for regulatory regimes, we define a set of event indicator variables, Et 
to denote the five time periods described in Section 3. We will also include quarter X year fixed 
effects in some specifications.  
 
Summary statistics 
Before proceeding to our econometric analyses, we present an overview and summary of the 
broad patterns in our data. 
In Panel A of Table 1, we present the summary statistics for the full sample of negotiated 
transfers. Of particular note, the mean of value loss (1 minus the ratio of the negotiated transfer 
price of non-tradable shares to the average stock price of corresponding tradable shares in the 
month prior to the deal) is 0.73. The full distribution of value loss is shown in Figure 1A. While 
there are many reasons that governments sell ownership stakes at a lower price, in many cases 
the discount is extreme: for more than 10 percent of transfers, value loss exceeds 0.9, and as 
shown in the table, the maximum is 0.99. More importantly, we show that value loss is strongly 
related to deal attributes that serve as markers for self-dealing. 
The mean of fraction transferred is 0.13; while this is a sizeable fraction of shares 
outstanding, there are relatively few control deals – only 22 percent of negotiated transfers result 
in a change in the controlling shareholder. This is indicative of the very high level of ownership 
concentration in publicly traded Chinese firms. 
Private buyer has a mean value of 0.69, i.e., in nearly 70 percent of transfers the 
purchaser is a private company. By contrast, private seller has a mean of 0.32, so nearly 70 
percent of transfers involve some form of state entity as the seller. Overall, it is thus the case that 
state sellers and private buyers dominate the share transfer market. Disguised sellers account for 17 
 
23 percent of all sales, or a third of all state-seller deals, while face-value SOE deals account for 
32 percent of transactions.  
Finally, we observe that the mean of dividend is only 0.4 percent. It will be important to 
control for this payout rate as well as share turnover, given that one could potentially account for 
some of the transfer discount based on the difference in liquidity between tradable and non-
tradable shares. 
In Panel B of Table 1, we present summary statistics to contrast the attributes of 
disguised and face-value SOE transactions. Recall that the underlying ownership in both cases is 
a state-owned enterprise, but in the case of disguised sellers, ownership is mis-declared as private 
in deal documents. The mean value of value loss for disguised sales is 0.80, versus 0.73 for face-
value SOE sales. In Figure 1B, we present the frequency distribution of value loss for the two 
seller types. The graph illustrates the extent of under-pricing is consistently greater for disguised 
sellers, as its value loss distribution is clearly shifted to the right, relative to face-value SOE. 
Further, disguised transactions are smaller (fraction transferred = 0.10, versus 0.16 for 
face-value SOE sellers), consistent with disguised sellers executing transactions that avoid 
greater scrutiny by regulators, which may be triggered for larger transactions. In Panel C, we 
present summary statistics for the firm-level panel data we will employ in analyzing the impact 
of transfers on subsequent firm performance. 
In Figure 2 we show the [-6,+6] moving average for deals per month; we boldface 
disguised and face-value SOE observations for ease of viewing. Interestingly, the two deal types 
follow similar patterns until the end of 2001, when the number of disguised transfers falls 
dramatically (coinciding with the announcement of strengthened disclosure requirements). The 
number of disguised transfers remains well below the number of face-value SOE transfers until 18 
 
the end of 2004, at which point the CSRC announced a conversion plan for non-tradable shares 
(Haveman and Wang, 2010), putting a damper on the negotiated transfer market. 
In Figure 3, we show the [-6,+6] moving average of value loss, with disguised and face-value 
SOE transfers boldfaced. While the level of value loss declines over time, average value loss for 
disguised firms is almost everywhere above that of all other seller types (and in particular above 
face-value SOE transfers). The pattern parallels that of Figure 2 – value loss is generally higher 
for disguised sellers, but with a steady decline for both types of sellers that sets in at the end of 
2001. Again, the timing is consistent with the increased regulatory oversight discussed in the 
preceding section. 
 
4. Results 
We begin by assessing the cross-sectional correlates of Value loss. Our main specifications are of 
the form: 
 
Value lossfd = β1Disguisedfd + β2Face-value SOEfd + β3Statefd + β4State buyerfd 
 
                              + β5log(Salesfy) + β6Turnoverfy + β7Dividendfy            (1)  
                          + β8Fraction transferredfdy + Fixed effects + εfd 
 
for negotiated transfer d of the shares of firm f  in year y (note that in many cases there are 
multiple transfers for a single firm in a given year). For seller ownership, the omitted variable is 
private. In all cases, we use robust standard errors clustered at the level of the listed firm. We 
report these results in Table 2. In the first column, we include only the ownership variables, 
disguised, state, face-value SOE, and private buyer. The coefficient on disguised is 0.102, 19 
 
significant at the 1 percent level. Face-value SOE is also significant at the 5 percent level in this 
largely unconditional regression, with a coefficient of 0.031. When we add year fixed effects in 
column (2), the coefficient on disguised drops to 0.045, significant at the 1 percent level; the 
coefficient on face-value SOE is now negative, though not significant. None of the other seller or 
buyer ownership coefficients is significant at conventional levels.  
The impact of including year dummies is not surprising, given the patterns observed in 
Figures 1 and 2 – disguised transfers are concentrated in the earlier years of our sample, when 
transfer discounts were also highest. Adding the year effects absorbs these compositional 
differences in the timing of deals. If it is the case that disguised deals took place in the earlier 
part of the sample period precisely because oversight was lax and hence under-pricing 
opportunities the greatest, then controlling for time period may understate the impact of 
disguised ownership on value loss. Consistent with this view, further analysis – presented below 
– shows that the impact of controlling for time is largely the result of regulatory shifts during 
2001-2002 that imposed greater scrutiny on transfers that simultaneously reduced value loss and 
also the number of disguised deals. 
In column (3) we add controls, including log(sales), turnover, dividends, and fraction 
transferred. The coefficient on disguised is largely unaffected (as are the coefficients on other 
ownership variables), increasing slightly in significance and magnitude. In column (4) we add 2-
digit SIC industry fixed effects; again, the results are largely unchanged. We add firm fixed 
effects in column (5), and the point estimate on disguised is again unchanged. Finally, in column 
(6) we limit the sample to state sellers (i.e. omitting private sellers); again, the results are largely 
unchanged. 20 
 
In Appendix Table A1, we provide results that further examine the impact of regulatory 
shifts during 2001-2002. In the first column, we use four event fixed effects – based on the time 
periods defined at the end of Section 2 – to control for regulatory regime. There is a modest 
increase in the coefficient on disguised relative to the year effects specification – 0.051 versus 
0.048 – for specifications with firm fixed effects. Thus, it appears that adding these four timing 
dummies largely controls for the effect of time, consistent with the primary explanation for the 
impact of year effects coming from a shift in regulation. In the second column, we include 
quarter X year fixed effects; these results are virtually identical to those with year effects only. 
In assessing the magnitude of the disguised coefficient, its value, 0.045, represents a 
relatively small fraction of the mean level of value loss (0.73). However, there are several 
important qualifications to be added. First, as explained above, the time effects included in most 
specifications may be over-controlling for the choice to make a disguised transfer during the 
earlier period of weaker oversight. Additionally, it is important to keep in mind that some 
fraction of the negotiated transfer discount is due to fundamentals like liquidity. Given the 
relative coefficients and standard deviations of turnover and disguised, their implied magnitudes 
are comparable; if time effects are omitted, the implied effect of disguised is much larger.  
We have argued that disguised transactions are likely a means of regulatory evasion to 
transfer value through under-priced asset sales. In this case, the under-pricing is the result of 
principal-agent problems in state (and to a lesser extent, also private) firms. That is, insiders do 
not bear the cost of selling at a discount, but may benefit from side payments or kickbacks in 
exchange for such discounts. A related mismatch of incentives may exist for private sellers – an 
insider at a selling firm may wish to transfer shares at a discount to a separate entity where he 
holds greater cash flow rights. We therefore look at the impact of related party transactions (RPT) 21 
 
on value loss in Table 3 (see, for example, Bertrand et al (2002), for a discussion on the 
tunneling incentives among related parties). The first five columns parallel those of Table 2, but 
with RPT included as a regressor. Consistent with negotiated transfers as a means of tunneling 
value by private firms, RPT takes on a positive coefficient, and in most specifications its 
magnitude is comparable to that of disguised, though RPT is no longer significant in the firm 
fixed effects specification, likely because of the relative rarity of RPT transactions (there were 
only 71 such transfers among private sellers). As with our disguised regressions, year fixed 
effects have a large impact on the RPT coefficient. The evidence is consistent with related party 
transactions occurring primarily in the earlier (less regulated) part of the sample; we also find 
that simply controlling for regulatory shifts has the same effect on the RPT coefficient as 
including a full set of year dummies (results omitted in the interests of space). Finally, in column 
(6), we limit the sample to private firms, where related party transactions would be an effective 
means of tunneling value. The coefficient in this specification increases to 0.069; by contrast, for 
the sample of state sellers the coefficient on RPT is only 0.02 (see column (7)), and is 
statistically indistinguishable from zero.  
The hypothesis that disguised sellers are under-pricing their transfers, and hence wish to 
elude scrutiny, has several subsidiary predictions for the data. As noted in Section 2, larger 
transfers trigger greater public disclosure. More importantly, larger transfers increase the 
likelihood of regulatory scrutiny, given the attention that such deals attract in the media. Thus, 
we expect disguised transactions – to the extent that this is a marker for more under-priced 
transactions – to be smaller relative, in particular, to face-value SOE transactions. We examine 
these additional predictions in Table 4, using specifications that parallel that of equation (1), but 
with fraction transferred as the outcome variables.  22 
 
In columns (1) and (2), the coefficient on disguised is indistinguishable from zero, 
implying that disguised sales are of comparable size on average to private sales. By contrast, for 
other SOE sellers, we find that the coefficient on face-value SOE is positive, large in magnitude, 
and significant at the 1 percent level. In column (3) we add firm fixed effects; once again the 
coefficient on face-value SOE is positive and significant, while the disguised coefficient is close 
to zero.  
To summarize thus far, we have documented a higher discount for transfers by disguised 
sellers, and that such sales are smaller in size (relative to sales by face-value SOE sellers). We 
argue that this set of patterns is consistent with disguised sales as a means of transferring value 
out of state sellers. 
We now assess whether under-priced transfers (and disguised sales in particular) had any 
impact on firm performance. As we explain in the introduction, the impact is theoretically 
ambiguous – there exist potential improvements in incentives and governance, though these may 
be offset by an increase in tunneling and other value destruction by insiders. We assess the effect 
of ownership transfers by examining announcement returns and also post-transfer operating 
performance. 
In Figure 4, Panel A, we graph the median cumulative abnormal returns for transfer 
announcement dates over a one month pre-event window [-d,1], for d = {1,2,3,…30}. Median 
returns are positive, implying investor expectations of increased post-transfer profitability. There 
is also striking evidence of pre-transfer information leakage – excess returns begin to dissipate 
about two weeks before the transfer announcement, and are close to zero on the actual 
announcement date. 23 
 
In Figure 4, Panel B, we present median CARs for the sample disaggregated by seller 
type. For ease of comparing different types of SOE transfers, we highlight the lines for disguised 
and face-value SOE sellers. For all seller types, pre-event returns are positive. Further, for 
sufficiently long windows (to remove the effect of information leakage), the median returns are 
comparable for the various seller types. 
In the first column of Table 5, we list the mean value of CAR[-d,1] for a range of 
windows (d= -1,-5,-10,-15,-20,-25,-30); for anything longer than the short two day [-1,1] 
window, average returns are positive and significant at least at the 5 percent level. (As Figure 3 
suggests, there is a very high rate of information leakage.) In the second column, we provide a 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test based on the fraction of transfer announcements where returns are 
positive. Again, for any window longer than two days, we find that significantly more than half 
of transfer announcements are associated with positive returns (above 55 percent of 
announcements for any window). 
In Table 6 we look at the determinants of event returns using a regression framework to 
assess whether there are different investor responses as a function of seller type. In all 
regressions, we include year and 2-digit industry effects, as well as controls for log(Sales) and 
fraction transferred. The coefficient on disguised is negative over shorter windows, indicating 
lower returns than private sellers. However, in no specification is the coefficient on disguised 
significantly different from that of face-value SOE (i.e., other SOE sales). Further, Figure 4B is 
suggestive of different rates of information leakage for different seller types, and for the two 
longer windows, there is no significant difference in returns as a function of seller ownership for 
any ownership type (though this could also result from greater noise over the longer event 
window).  24 
 
In summary, we find that investors respond positively to transfers, under-pricing 
notwithstanding. There is little evidence that investors respond differently to sales as a function 
of ownership type. It is worth noting that we cannot use value loss as an independent variable in 
these specifications since value loss and  CARs are mechanically correlated due to the 
appearance of stock price in both variables. 
We next turn to assessing whether investor beliefs in profit improvements are validated 
based on post-transfer earnings, and attempt to trace out the sources of higher profitability, 
looking at total prior transfers as well as the weighted average of value loss as measures of the 
extent and corruption of transfers respectively. 
To account for the cumulative impact of transfers – ownership changes are permanent and hence 
we expect that the “stock” of ownership matters rather than the flow of ownership changes – we 
use the accumulated share transfers up to year y, prior transfersy; our proxy for the corruption of 
prior transfers is Weighted Valueloss, the weighted average of value loss from all prior transfers. 
Our regressions take the following form: 
 
log(Assetsfy+1) = β1Prior transfersfy + β2Weighted Valuelossfy  
                          +Controls + Firm and year fixed effects + εfy                      (2) 
 
  
In Table 7, we report results for log(Assets), ROA, investment rate, and leverage as 
outcome variables. There is evidence of higher profitability as indicated by the positive 
coefficient on Prior transfers in the ROA regression, significant at the 5 percent level; however, 
Weighted Valueloss, our proxy for extent of corruption during privatization, has no impact on 
financial performance after controlling for cumulative ownership change. This is consistent with 
the positive announcement returns reported in Tables 5, and the view that shifting ownership to 25 
 
private entities is generally better for shareholders. Further, it is broadly consistent with the event 
study findings that transfers prone to corruption (e.g., disguised transfers, and generally those 
made at high discount) have very little impact on future performance. The coefficient on prior 
transfers is not significant in predicting any other operating measures (investment, leverage, 
sales).
17  
In our final set of analyses, we examine the channels of improved profitability. We focus, 
in particular, on employment changes as a function of prior transfers. We look at three separate 
measures of labor force impact – (the logarithm of) the total wage bill; log(employment); and 
log[(total wage bill)/employment]. We present these results in columns (5) – (7) of Table 7. The 
coefficient on prior transfers is large in magnitude, implying a 13 percent ownership transfer 
(the median transfer size) results in a 4.4 percent decline in the wage bill, while Weighted 
Valueloss again has no significant impact on these variables. The subsequent two columns shows 
that this effect comes entirely from workforce reductions rather than lower salaries – the impact 
on average wages is actually positive, though not statistically significant. There is no significant 
effect on cost of goods sold or administrative overhead broadly defined (omitted in the interests 
of space). In results not reported here, we find that these employment effects are largest for SOE 
sellers – both disguised and face-value, implying that such transfers allow for greatest cost-
cutting through shedding labor. In summary, although corruption during privatization leads to a 
wealth loss for the state owners, there is a benefit, on average, in operating performance which 
seems largely invariant to the extent of underpricing in the asset sales. 
 
                                                 
17 When we disaggregate prior transfers into the cumulative transfers made by each seller type (disguised, face-
value SOE, state, private), the results are broadly consistent with the market reaction findings – there is a positive 
impact of transfers on profitability for non-disguised firms, with relatively weak profit improvements for disguised 
sellers. However, given the large standard errors, we cannot reject that all seller ownership coefficients are equal in 
magnitude. (These results are omitted in the interests of space, but available from the authors on request.) 26 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we document the correlates of under-pricing of state asset sales in China, in 
particular, the higher discounts in transfers by “disguised” sellers and in related party 
transactions. We argue that these patterns are consistent with under-pricing in asset sales as a 
means of value transfer. Despite the apparent self-dealing in these transactions, we document a 
positive response from investors – market reaction to announced asset sales is positive, a 
response that is validated by subsequent improvements in profitability. These profit 
improvements may be attributed in part to workforce reductions. 
Our results are broadly consistent with the view that privatization may improve 
performance, at least as measured by firm profitability, even when the process is corrupted. 
Performance improvements are observed even for those transfers with deal attributes suggestive 
of self-dealing (i.e. disguised transfers and related party transactions). While we study China 
here, weak private sector governance is prevalent in many economies, and our results are 
suggestive of potential benefits from privatizations even in such environments.  27 
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Figure 1A – Distribution of Value Loss 
 
 
 
Note: Value loss is equal to 1 minus the ratio of the negotiated transfer price of non-tradable shares to the average stock price of 
corresponding tradable shares in the month prior to the deal. The graph shows the distribution of value loss for 2121 negotiated 
transfer deals during 1995 – 1997. 
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Figure 1B – Distribution of value loss by seller ownership 
 
 
Note: Value loss is equal to 1 minus the ratio of the negotiated transfer price of non-tradable shares to the average stock price of 
corresponding tradable shares in the month prior to the deal. Disguised sellers are state-owned entities selling shares where the 
holdings are registered as private in deal documents; Face-value SOE sellers are state-owned entities that honestly represented their 
ownership in deal documents. The graph shows the distribution of value loss for these transfer deals during 1995 – 1997. 
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Figure 2: Number of negotiated transfer deals by type of seller, [-6,+6] month moving average 
 
 
 
Notes: The graph shows the (weighted average) distribution of negotiated transfer deals during 1997 – 1997. Disguised sellers are 
state-owned entities selling shares where the holdings are registered as private in deal documents; State sellers are state entity; Face-
value SOE sellers are state-owned entities that have honestly represented their ownership in deal documents; Private sellers are private 
firms. 
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Figure 3: Mean Value loss of negotiated transfers, by seller type, [-6,+6] month moving average 
 
 
Notes: Value loss is equal to 1 minus the ratio of the negotiated transfer price of non-tradable shares to the average stock price of 
corresponding tradable shares in the month prior to the deal. The graph shows the (weighted average) distribution of negotiated 
transfer deals during 1997 – 1997. Disguised sellers are state-owned entities selling shares where the holdings are registered as private 
in deal documents; State sellers are state entity; Face-value SOE sellers are state-owned entities that have honestly represented their 
ownership in deal documents; Private sellers are private firms. 
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Figure 4A: Median cumulative abnormal returns for transfer announcements for windows [-30,1] to [-1,1] 
 
 
Notes: CAR[-d,1] is the cumulative event returns over window [-d,1] around the first announcement of each negotiated transfer. 
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Figure 4B: Median CARS by seller type for transfer announcements for windows [-30,1] to [-1,1] 
 
 
Notes: CAR[-d,1] is the cumulative event returns over window [-d,1] around the first announcement of each negotiated transfer. 
Disguised sellers are state-owned entities selling shares where the holdings are registered as private in deal documents; State sellers 
are state entity; Face-value SOE sellers are state-owned entities that have honestly represented their ownership in deal documents; 
Private sellers are private firms. 
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Table 1 - Summary Statistics 
Panel A - Full sample of negotiated transfer data 
   Mean  Std Dev  Min  Max  Observations
Value Loss  0.73  0.21  -2.17  0.99  2121 
Fraction Transferred  0.13  0.12  0.00  0.75  2121 
log(Sales) 19.35  1.35  11.67  24.42  2121 
Dividend Ratio (*100)  0.40  0.85  0.00  8.24  2121 
Turnover 4.18  2.56  0.39  17.77  2121 
Private Seller  0.32  0.47  0.00  1.00  2121 
Face-value SOE  0.32  0.47  0.00  1.00  2121 
Private   0.69  0.46  0.00  1.00  2121 
State 0.14  0.34  0.00  1.00  2121 
Disguised 0.23  0.42  0.00  1.00  2121 
RPT 0.08  0.27  0.00  1.00  2121 
Notes: Value loss  is equal to 1 minus the ratio of the negotiated transfer price of non-tradable 
shares to the average stock price of corresponding tradable shares in the month prior to the deal; 
Fraction Transferred is the ratio of shares transferred in this deal to all outstanding shares; 
Log(sales) is the log value of total sales of the listed firm in the last year; Dividend Ratio is the 
ratio of dividends over price in the year prior to the deal; Turnover is average daily turnover in 
the past year; Disguised is a dummy variable denoting a state-owned entity selling shares where 
the holdings are registered as private in deal documents; State is a dummy denoting the seller is a 
state entity; Face-value SOE is a dummy variable indicating a SOE seller that has honestly 
represented its ownership in deal documents; Private is a dummy variable indicating whether the 
seller is a private firm; Private Buyer is a dummy indicating the buyer is a private firm; RPT is a 
dummy variable indicating whether the seller and the buyer are related parties according to 
China accounting rules.    37 
 
Panel B - Summary statistics of Face-value SOE firms and Disguised firms 
  
Face-value SOE =1  Disguised=1 
Value Loss  0.730  0.801 
Fraction Transferred  0.156  0.099 
log(Sales) 19.494  19.191 
Dividend Ratio (*100)  0.398  0.314 
Turnover 4.149  4.554 
Observations 674  480 
Notes: Value loss  is equal to 1 minus the ratio of the negotiated transfer price of non-tradable 
shares to the average stock price of corresponding tradable shares in the month prior to the deal; 
Fraction Transferred is the ratio of shares transferred in this deal to all outstanding shares; 
Log(sales) is the log value of total sales of the listed firm in the last year; Dividend Ratio is the 
ratio of dividends over price in the year prior to the deal; Turnover is average daily turnover in 
the past year; Disguised is a dummy variable denoting a state-owned entity selling shares where 
the holdings are registered as private in deal documents; Face-value SOE is a dummy variable 
indicating a SOE seller that has honestly represented its ownership in deal documents. 
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Panel C - Summary statistics for firm-year panel data, 1995-2007 
 
   Mean  Std Dev  Min  Max  Observations 
Log(Assets) 20.96  0.97  17.12  26.98  9368 
ROA 0.02  0.19  -8.67  0.52  9192 
Investment Ratio  0.06  0.07  -0.04  0.75  7987 
Leverage 0.24  0.25  0.00  13.26  9364 
log(Wage Bill)  17.51  1.21  10.96  23.65  7976 
log(Employees) 7.30  1.30  1.79  12.95  6767 
log(Average Wage)  10.30  0.97  5.02  17.05  6628 
Weighted Valueloss  0.22  0.35  0  0.98  10709 
Prior  Transfers  0.10 0.22 0.00 1.93  10709 
log(Sales) 20.09  1.33  7.95  27.41  10511 
Log(1+Tobin's  Q)  1.20 0.37 0.33 5.38  10458 
KZ-index 0.92  2.49  -116.61  122.67  10458 
Note: Log(Assets) is the log value of total assets in year t+1; ROA is the ratio of 
net profits to total assets in year t+1; Investment Ratio is the ratio of investment to 
total assets in year t+1; Leverage is the ratio of total borrowings to total assets of 
the listed firm in year t+1; Wage Bill is the total wage paid to workers in year t+1; 
Employees is the total number of employees in year t+1; Average Wage is the 
ratio of total wage bill to the number of employees in year t+1; Weighted 
Valueloss is the cumulative weighted value loss up to year t; Prior Transfer is the 
cumulative transferred ownership up to year t; Log(Sales) is the log value of total 
sales in year t; Tobin's Q is the ratio of market value to book value in year t; KZ-
Index is calculated using Kaplan-Zingales (1997) coefficients for each listed firm 
in year t.  
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Table 2 – Effect of seller type on value loss 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Disguised 0.102***  0.045*** 0.047*** 0.043*** 0.048***  0.044*** 
(0.016) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.011) 
State 0.002  -0.023  -0.014  -0.008  -0.007  -0.003 
(0.019) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)  (0.022)  (0.014) 
Face-value SOE  0.031**  -0.009  -0.002  -0.003  0.015 
(0.015) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)  (0.013) 
Private Buyer  0.002  0.004  -0.001  -0.001  -0.015  -0.003 
(0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)  (0.016)  (0.012) 
Dividend Ratio  -1.110  -1.245*  -1.407  -2.31*** 
(0.730) (0.745)  (1.190)  (0.790) 
Turnover 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.000  0.007*** 
(0.002) (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002) 
log(Sales) 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.003  0.029*** 
(0.006) (0.007)  (0.020)  (0.005) 
Fraction Transferred  -0.027  -0.037  -0.086*  -0.024 
(0.036) (0.038)  (0.052)  (0.038) 
Sample  Full Full Full Full  Full  State 
sellers 
Fixed Effects  No Year  Year  Ind & 
Year 
Firm & 
Year 
Ind & 
Year 
Observations 2121  2121  2121  2121  2121  1439 
R-squared  0.04 0.35 0.38 0.42  0.77  0.47 
Notes: The dependent variable in all specifications is Value Loss, equal to 1 minus the ratio 
of the negotiated transfer price of non-tradable shares to the average stock price of 
corresponding tradable shares in the month prior to the deal; Disguised is a dummy variable 
denoting a state-owned entity selling shares where the holdings are registered as private in 
deal documents; State is a dummy denoting the seller is a state entity; Face-value SOE is a 
dummy variable indicating a SOE seller that has honestly represented its ownership in deal 
documents; Private (the omitted category of seller type) is a dummy variable indicating 
whether the seller is a private firm; Private Buyer is a dummy indicating the buyer is a 
private firm; Dividend Ratio is the ratio of dividends over price in the year prior to the deal; 
Turnover is average daily turnover in the past year; Log(sales) is the log value of total sales 
of the listed firm in the last year; Fraction Transferred is the ratio of shares transferred in 
this deal to all outstanding shares.   In all cases, the columns report the results of a linear 
regression with standard errors clustered at the firm level included in parentheses. In 
specifications with industry fixed effects, the industry is defined at the 2-digit SIC level.  * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 40 
 
Table 3 -  Effect of related party transactions (RPT) on value loss 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Disguised 0.103*** 0.045***  0.048***  0.044***  0.049***  0.043*** 
(0.016) (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.011) 
State 0.005  -0.022  -0.011  -0.004  -0.005  -0.002 
(0.019) (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.022)  (0.014) 
Face-value SOE  0.033**  -0.008  0.000  0.000  0.016 
(0.015) (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.013) 
Private Buyer  0.001  0.004  -0.002  -0.002  -0.016  0.004  -0.002 
(0.013) (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.015)  (0.023)  (0.011) 
Dividend Ratio  -1.172  -1.331*  -1.327  0.092  -2.32*** 
(0.713) (0.733) (1.205)  (1.227)  (0.794) 
Turnover 0.009***  0.008***  0.000  0.008  0.007*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)  (0.006)  (0.002) 
log(Sales) -0.020*** -0.022***  0.002  -0.007  -0.029*** 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.020)  (0.019)  (0.005) 
Fraction Transferred  -0.033  -0.045  -0.088*  -0.090  -0.027 
(0.037) (0.038) (0.052)  (0.111)  (0.039) 
RPT   0.037*  0.019  0.039**  0.045**  0.028  0.069**  0.020 
(0.020) (0.020)  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.020)  (0.027)  (0.026) 
Sample Full  Full  Full Full Full  Private 
Seller 
State 
Seller 
Fixed Effects  No  Year  Year  Ind & 
Year 
Firm & 
Year  Ind & Year Ind & 
Year 
Observations  2121 2121  2121  2121  2121  682  1439 
R-squared  0.04  0.36 0.39 0.42 0.77  0.43  0.47 41 
 
Notes: The dependent variable in all specifications is Value Loss,  equal to 1 minus the ratio of the negotiated 
transfer price of non-tradable shares to the average stock price of corresponding tradable shares in the month 
prior to the deal; RPT is a dummy variable indicating whether the seller and the buyer are related parties 
according to China accounting rules; Disguised is a dummy variable denoting a state-owned entity selling 
shares where the holdings are registered as private in deal documents; State is a dummy denoting the seller is a 
state entity; Face-value SOE is a dummy variable indicating a SOE seller that has honestly represented its 
ownership in deal documents; Private (the omitted category of seller type) is a dummy variable indicating 
whether the seller is a private firm; Private Buyer is a dummy indicating the buyer is a private firm; Log(sales) 
is the log value of total sales of the listed firm in the last year; Fraction Transferred is the ratio of shares 
transferred in this deal to all outstanding shares. In all cases, the columns report the results of a linear regression 
with standard errors clustered at the firm level included in parentheses. In specifications with industry fixed 
effects, the industry is defined at the 2-digit SIC level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1% 
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Table 4: –The determinants of transfer size 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
Disguised 0.004  0.004  0.002 
(0.007) (0.007)  (0.008) 
State   0.103***  0.099***  0.073*** 
(0.010) (0.010)  (0.014) 
Face-value SOE  0.056***  0.051***  0.020** 
(0.007) (0.007)  (0.008) 
Private Buyer  -0.020***  -0.017**  -0.003 
(0.007) (0.007)  (0.008) 
Dividend Ratio  -0.604  -1.301** 
(0.405) (0.641) 
Turnover 0.001  -0.001 
(0.002) (0.002) 
log(Sales) -0.004  -0.002 
(0.003) (0.005) 
Fixed Effects  Year  Ind & Year  Firm&Year 
Observations 2121 2121  2121 
R-squared 0.11  0.19  0.67 
Notes: The dependent variable in column (1),(2) and (3) is Fraction Transferred, 
the ratio of shares transferred in this deal to all outstanding shares. Disguised is a 
dummy variable denoting a state-owned entity selling shares where the holdings 
are registered as private in deal documents; State is a dummy denoting the seller 
is a state entity; Face-value SOE is a dummy variable indicating a SOE seller 
that has honestly represented its ownership in deal documents; Private  (the 
omitted category of seller type) is a dummy variable indicating whether the 
seller is a private firm; Private Buyer is a dummy indicating the buyer is a 
private firm; Turnover is average daily turnover in the past year; Log(sales) is 
the log value of total sales of the listed firm in the last year;   In all cases, the 
columns report the results of a linear regression with standard errors clustered at 
the firm level included in parentheses. In specifications with industry fixed 
effects, the industry is defined at the 2-digit SIC level.  * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 43 
 
 
Table 5 - Event Studies: Summary Statistics and Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
    Mean Value  Positive returns 
(%) 
Wilcoxon signed-rank Test
   Z-value  Prob  >  |z| 
CAR[-1,1]  0.004   51.3   2.258   0.024  
CAR[-5,1]  0.011   56.7   6.493   0.000  
CAR[-10,1]  0.015   55.7   6.328   0.000  
CAR[-15,1]  0.018   58.3   7.146   0.000  
CAR[-20,1]  0.021   57.3   7.084   0.000  
CAR[-25,1]  0.022   56.1   6.467   0.000  
CAR[-30,1]  0.022   55.2   5.886   0.000  
Notes:  CAR[-d,1] is the cumulative event returns over window [-d,1] (d=1, 5, 
10, 15, 20, 25, 30, respectively) around the first announcement of negotiated 
transfers; Data are collapsed at the level of the listed firm X announcement date 
since some listed firms announced multiple transfers in one day.  44 
 
Table 6 - Relationship between cumulative abnormal event returns and Disguised: Full Sample 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
    CAR[-1,1] CAR[-5,1] CAR[-10,1]  CAR[-15,1] CAR[-20,1] CAR[-25,1] CAR[-30,1] 
Disguised -0.006*  -0.007*  -0.011**  -0.017***  -0.016**  -0.013  -0.010 
(0.003) (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Face-value SOE  -0.009***  -0.009**  -0.004  -0.009  -0.006  -0.003  -0.003 
(0.003) (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.008) 
State -0.008**  0.001  -0.000  -0.003  -0.004  -0.001  -0.002 
(0.004) (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.009) 
log(Sales) -0.001  -0.003**  -0.006***  -0.004**  -0.003  -0.003  -0.004* 
(0.001) (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Fraction Transferred  0.037***  0.048***  0.051***  0.073***  0.083***  0.101***  0.111*** 
(0.010) (0.012)  (0.017)  (0.020)  (0.022)  (0.025)  (0.025) 
Private Buyer  -0.000  0.001  -0.002  -0.004  -0.003  0.003  -0.003 
(0.003) (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007) 
Fixed Effects  Industry & Year 
Observations 1984  2032  2043  2062  2068  2070  2073 
R-squared 0.11  0.11  0.10  0.11  0.11  0.11  0.11 
Notes: The dependent variables are cumulative event returns over [-d,1] window around the announcement of transfers where d=1, 5, 
10, 15, 20, 25, 30, respectively. Disguised is a dummy variable denoting a state-owned entity selling shares where the holdings are 
registered as private in deal documents; State is a dummy denoting the seller is a state entity; Face-value SOE is a dummy variable 
indicating a SOE seller that has honestly represented its ownership in deal documents; Private (the omitted category of seller type) is 
a dummy variable indicating whether the seller is a private firm; Private Buyer is a dummy indicating the buyer is a private firm; 
Log(sales) is the log value of total sales of the listed firm in the last year; Log(sales) is the log value of total sales of the listed firm in 
the last year; Fraction Transferred is the ratio of shares transferred in this deal to all outstanding shares.   In all cases, the columns 
report the results of a linear regression with standard errors clustered at the firm level included in parentheses. In specifications with 
industry fixed effects, the industry is defined at the 2-digit SIC level.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1% 45 
 
 
Table 7 - Relationship among listed firm level financials, Weighted Valueloss and Prior Transfers 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) 
Dependent Variable  Log(Assets) ROA  Inv Ratio  Leverage  Wage Bill  Employees  Avg Wage 
Weighted Valueloss  0.105**  -0.002  -0.005  0.041***  0.050  0.048  0.016 
(0.042) (0.006) (0.005) (0.011) (0.053) (0.075)  (0.067) 
Prior Transfers  -0.075  0.020**  0.012  -0.031  -0.383***  -0.565***  0.144 
  (0.077) (0.010) (0.008) (0.023) (0.114) (0.164)  (0.133) 
log(Sales) 0.008***  0.004**  0.003  0.378***  0.269***  0.077*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.030) (0.043)  (0.025) 
Log(1+Tobin's Q)  -0.694***  0.058***  0.028***  -0.069***  -0.264***  -0.203***  -0.027 
(0.044) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.044) (0.065)  (0.053) 
Kaplan-Zingales 
Index -0.001** 
(0.000) 
Fixed Effects  Firm & Year 
Observations 9085  8633  7455  8840  7600  6410  6299
R-squared 0.88  0.42  0.51  0.66  0.90  0.89  0.82 
Notes:  The dependent variables are log value of total assets, ROA which is defined as the ratio of net profits (after tax) to total 
assets; the ratio of investment to total assets, the ratio of total borrowings to total assets of the listed firm, total wage bills, total 
number of employees and average wage which is defined as total wage bill divided by total number of employees, respectively. 
Kaplan-Zingales Index is calculated using Kaplan-Zingales (1997) coefficients for each listed firm in our sample; Prior 
Transfers are cumulative transfers in this listed firm; Weighted Valueloss is the size-weighted valueloss up to year t; Other 
variables are self-explained.  In all cases, the columns report the results of a linear regression with standard errors clustered at the 
firm level included in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
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Table A1- Effect of ownership on value loss, further time controls 
   (1)  (2) 
Disguised 0.051***  0.045*** 
(0.014) (0.011) 
State 0.019  -0.006 
(0.024) (0.022) 
Face-value SOE  0.033**  0.012 
(0.015) (0.013) 
Private Buyer  -0.019  -0.014 
(0.018) (0.015) 
Dividend Ratio  -2.887**  -1.456 
(1.208) (1.184) 
Turnover -0.007**  0.000 
(0.004) (0.003) 
log(Sales) -0.002  0.004 
(0.020) (0.020) 
Fraction Transferred  -0.122**  -0.073 
(0.060) (0.051) 
Fixed Effects  Regulatory 
regime & firm  quarter*year & firm 
Observations 2121  2121 
R-squared 0.73  0.79 
Notes: The dependent variable in all specifications is Value Loss, equal to 1 minus 
the ratio of the negotiated transfer price of non-tradable shares to the average stock 
price of corresponding tradable shares in the month prior to the deal; Disguised is a 
dummy variable denoting a state-owned entity selling shares where the holdings are 
registered as private in deal documents; State is a dummy denoting the seller is a 
state entity; Face-value SOE is a dummy variable indicating a SOE seller that has 
honestly represented its ownership in deal documents; Private (the omitted category 
of seller type) is a dummy variable indicating whether the seller is a private firm; 
Private Buyer is a dummy indicating the buyer is a private firm; Log(sales) is the 
log value of total sales of the listed firm in the last year; Dividend Ratio is the ratio 
of dividends over price in the year prior to the deal; Turnover is average daily 
turnover in the past year; Log(sales) is the log value of total sales of the listed firm 
in the last year; Fraction Transferred is the ratio of shares transferred in this deal to 
all outstanding shares.   In all cases, the columns report the results of a linear 
regression with standard errors clustered at the firm level included in parentheses. In 
specifications with industry fixed effects, the industry is defined at the 2-digit SIC 
level.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 